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We study the representative consumer’s risk attitude and eﬃcient risk-sharing rules in a single-
period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but
heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tol-
erance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the
curvature of an individual consumer’s individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautious-
ness, the ﬁrst derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences
of these results and reﬁnements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: D51, D58, D81, G11, G12, G13.
Keywords: Aggregation, heterogeneous consumers, absolute risk tolerance, mutual fund
theorem.1 Introduction
We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty with a single good and a single consump-
tion period, in which all consumers hold common probability assessments over the state space
and yet diﬀering expected utility functions. Two well known properties hold for each Pareto
eﬃcient allocation in such an economy. First, every consumer’s consumption level is uniquely
determined by the aggregate consumption level. Hence every consumer’s state-contingent
consumption levels can be speciﬁed as a function, called the risk sharing rule, of aggregate
consumption levels. Second, there exists a representative consumer, having an expected utility
function, in the sense that the support price of the single-consumer economy consisting solely
of the representative consumer is also the support price for the Pareto eﬃcient allocation of
the original, multi-consumer economy.
The benchmark result on this subject matter is the mutual fund theorem. The mutual
fund theorem states that if all consumers have a constant, common absolute cautiousness1,
then the representative consumer also has the same constant absolute cautiousness and all
individuals’ risk-sharing rules are linear (aﬃne). It has been well perceived in the literature
that the assumptions for the mutual fund theorem are so stringent that the applicability of
the theorem is questionable. Recent empirical studies into individuals’ risk attitudes report
a substantial amount of heterogeneity. Barsky et al (1997)2 report that 5% of individuals
display an, assumed constant, relative risk aversion of 33 or higher, the median is around 7,
while only 5% of individuals display a relative risk aversion of 1.3 or lower.
While there have been many contributions dealing with cases in which the assumption of
a constant common cautiousness is not met, they tend to concentrate on rather special cases
with regards to consumers’ risk attitudes, the number of consumers in the economy, wealth
distributions across consumers, and probabilistic distributions of initial endowments and asset
returns. Moreover, they often appeal to numerical, as opposed to analytical, methods, without
fully clarifying the principles behind their results.
In this paper, we obtain qualitative results concerning the implications of heterogeneous
absolute cautiousness on the risk-sharing rules and the representative consumer’s risk atti-
tude which are true for any Pareto eﬃcient allocation and do not depend on the particular
1Cautiousness, as deﬁned in Wilson (1968), is the ﬁrst derivative with respect to consumption of the
reciprocal of absolute risk aversion.
2We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this paper.
1characteristics of the economy. Should ﬁnancial markets be complete, equilibrium allocations
are Pareto eﬃcient, and our results are therefore true for all equilibrium allocations. The
contribution of this paper is, in short, to provide a detailed description of the way in which
the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness is not constant and the risk-sharing rules
are not linear in general environments.
There are essentially two main results in this paper. The ﬁrst result is that heterogeneity of
individual risk attitudes has a convexifying eﬀect on absolute risk tolerance. For instance, if all
individuals have HARA preferences3 (and, hence, linear risk-tolerance), but with heterogenous
cautiousness, then the representative consumer has strictly convex risk tolerance. In particular
this implies that the representative consumer may well be very diﬀerent from any individual
in the economy, his utility function may not even be in the same class as every individual’s.
While it is impossible to provide closed-form solutions to the representative consumer’s utility
function we can say a lot about its qualitative properties.
The second result is about the shape of individual consumer’s risk sharing rules. While,
again, closed-form solutions are not obtainable, we can make very deﬁnite statements about
the curvature of risk-sharing rules as well as their limiting behavior. We obtain even more
concrete results in the case of heterogeneous consumers with HARA preferences.
Throughout the paper we establish our results for the static, one-period model. Hara
(2006) showed that it is possible to extend all the results to the multi-period case provided
all consumers have time-homogeneous and time-separable expected utility functions and the
same time-discount rate. Hence, our results are directly comparable with dynamic models
such as those of Mehra and Prescott (1985), Dumas (1989), Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
Wang (1996), Benninga and Mayshar (2000), and Chan and Kogan (2002), where there are
multiple consumption periods and a common discount rate is assumed.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and preliminary results.
Section 3 provides a formula for the curvature of individual consumers’ risk-sharing rules,
while Section 4 gives a formula for the representative consumer’s absolute risk tolerance.
Section 5 investigates the limiting behavior of the risk-sharing rules and the representative
consumer’s risk attitudes when aggregate consumption tends to the upper or lower bounds.
Section 6 takes up the special case of HARA preferences. We defer much of the discussion of
our results to Section 7.
3HARA stands for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion.
22 Model
There are I consumers, i 2 f1;:::;Ig: Consumer i has a von-Neumann Morgenstern (also
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and ui is inﬁnitely many times diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes u0
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The uncertainty of the economy is described by a probability measure space (Ω;F;P).
The probability measure P speciﬁes the common (objective) belief on the likelihood of the
states. Denote by E the expectation with respect to P. The aggregate endowment of the
economy and each consumer’s consumption are both random variables on the probability
measure space.
The assumption of a common probabilistic belief and expected utility allows the eﬃcient
allocations to be represented in terms of risk-sharing rules. Write d =
P
di and d =
P
di.



















, where fi is the i-th coordinate
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By strict concavity for each x, there exists at most one solution to this problem, which we
denote by f¸(x). If, additionally, the ui satisfy the Inada condition, that is, u0
i (xi) ! 1 as
xi ! di and u0
i (xi) ! 0 as xi ! di, then, for every ¸ and x, there exists a solution.
Let ³, measurable in (Ω;F;P), denote the aggregate endowment in the economy. It is
well known (see e.g. Borch (1962, p. 428) and Wilson (1968), and is nicely explained in Kreps
(1990, Section 5.4)) that a feasible allocation (³¤
1;:::;³¤
I) is eﬃcient if and only if it there is
a ¸ 2 IRI
++ such that ³¤
i = f¸i(³) for every i.4
Let f be such an eﬃcient risk-sharing rule. Denote the maximum attained in the problem
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4To be exact, to establish this equivalence, we need to guarantee that E (ui(f¸i(³))) is ﬁnite for every i. A
suﬃcient condition for this is given in Huang (2002).
3the function u can be interpreted as the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function of the
representative consumer corresponding to the eﬃcient risk-sharing rule f. Note that the
assumption of the common probabilistic belief is crucial for this interpretation of u. By the
implicit function theorem, u is smooth. To contrast with the representative consumer, we
sometimes refer to the I consumers as individual consumers.







The reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion, 1=ai (xi), is the absolute risk tolerance and denoted
by ti (xi). The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion of consumer i is deﬁned, for







The reciprocal of the relative risk aversion, 1=bi (xi), is the relative risk tolerance and denoted
by si (xi). All of these are smooth functions.
Wilson (1968, page 129) referred to the ﬁrst derivative of the absolute risk tolerance,
t0
i(xi), as cautiousness, but we shall call it the absolute cautiousness, to distinguish it from
the relative cautiousness, which is s0
i(xi).
The absolute risk aversion a(x), absolute risk tolerance t(x), relative risk aversion b(x),
relative risk tolerance s(x), absolute cautiousness t0(x), and relative cautiousness s0(x) are
similarly deﬁned for the representative consumer’s utility function u. Bear in mind that
they depend on the choice of an eﬃcient risk-sharing rule f and hence on the choice of the
weights ¸, although none of our analytical results depends on the choice of ¸. In particular, if
markets are complete, then the ﬁrst welfare theorem implies that every equilibrium allocation
is eﬃcient. Hence our results are applicable to equilibrium allocations. The values of ¸ are
then determined by the individual consumers’ initial endowments as well as the choice of an
equilibrium in case there is more than one, but our analytical results always hold regardless
of the speciﬁcation of initial endowments or the choice of an equilibrium.
The following lemma is due to Wilson (1968, Theorems 4 and 5).
Lemma 1 (Wilson (1968)) Let f be an eﬃcient risk-sharing rule and t be the representa-


















Here are some implications of this lemma. First, by (2), f0
i(x) > 0, so that fi is strictly
increasing for every x. This property is called comonotonicity. Also note that
P
f0
i(x) = 1 and
hence that f0
i(x) can be interpreted as a probability mass function over the set of individual
consumers. Equation (4) then states that the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness
is the expected absolute cautiousness of the individual consumers with respect to the this
probability mass function. Third, both the absolute risk tolerance and absolute cautiousness



















An immediate corollary of inequality (6) is a suﬃcient condition for the monotonicity of t,
and hence of a.
Corollary 2 If ti (or ai) is non-decreasing (or non-increasing) for every i, then so is t (or
a).
3 Curvature of the Eﬃcient Risk-Sharing Rules
The following proposition is rich in interpretations.














i (fi(x)) ¡ t0(x)
¢
: (7)
Proof of Proposition 3 By equality (2),
ti (fi(x)) = t(x)f0
i(x) (8)










5Rearranging this, we complete the proof. ¥
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is quite simple: Since, by (2), the marginal risk-
sharing f0
i(x) is proportional to the absolute cautiousness t0
i(fi(x)), it must be increased for
those consumers for whom the absolute cautiousness increases faster than the average, which
is t0(x) by (4).




and every i, f00
i (x) > 0 if t0
i (fi(x)) >
t0(x); f00
i (x) = 0 if t0
i (fi(x)) = t0(x); and f00
i (x) < 0 if t0
i (fi(x)) < t0(x). This seems similar to
Proposition II of Leland (1980) but in fact diﬀers crucially from it in that the absolute risk
tolerance t is derived from the eﬃcient risk-sharing rule f rather than exogenously given.5 Its
message is otherwise the same: an individual consumer’s risk-sharing rule is (locally) convex
if he is more absolutely cautious than the representative consumer; (locally) concave if he is
less so; and (inﬁnitesimally) linear if they are equally absolutely cautious. In the context of
portfolio insurance, as in Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981), it implies that only
those who are more absolutely cautious than the representative consumer at every level x of
aggregate consumption would purchase portfolio insurances.6




and all i and
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t0
i (fi(x)) R t0
















j(x), often appear in expected utility theory. They measure the curvatures of the




j(x) for every x
if and only if fi is a convex function of fj. Proposition 3 therefore implies that the degree
of convexity of fi is positively related to consumer i’s absolute cautiousness. That is, the
marginal consumption that consumer i receives as the aggregate endowment increases grows
at a rate higher than its counterpart for consumer j if consumer i is more absolutely cautious
than consumer j. What this means in the context of portfolio insurance is that consumer i
5Section 7 contains a more detailed discussion.
6Note that Section 14 of Gollier (2001) investigated a similar maximization problem to (1), albeit in a
somewhat diﬀerent context. Speciﬁcally, our set of consumers is replaced by the state space, our utility weights
are replaced by the probability measure on the state space, our consumers’ utility functions are replaced by
state-contingent utility functions, and our resource-feasibility constraint is replaced by the budget constraint.
Then Proposition 52 of Gollier (2001) can be seen to be quite similar to this implication. We are grateful to
an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this analogy.
6purchases more portfolio insurance (or options) relative to the size of the reference portfolio
he holds than consumer j does.
Our result also shows that the levels of risk tolerance do not matter for the curvatures of
the risk-sharing rules, although they do matter for the slopes.7
4 Representative Consumer’s Risk Tolerance
Throughout this section, we let f be an eﬃcient risk-sharing rule and denote by a, t, b, and
s the representative consumer’s absolute risk aversion, absolute risk tolerance, relative risk
aversion, and relative risk tolerance, corresponding to f.
We show that if every consumer exhibits convex absolute risk-tolerance (non-decreasing
absolute cautiousness), then so does the representative consumer. Moreover, even the slightest
heterogeneity in consumers’ absolute cautiousness would cause the representative consumer’s
absolute risk-tolerance to be strictly convex (that is, the representative consumer’s cautious-
ness would be strictly increasing). The following formula establishes these conclusions.


















i (fi(x)) ¡ t0(x)
¢2 : (10)
Recall that, by equality (4), the mean of the individual consumers’ absolute cautiousness
t0
i(fi(x)) with respect to the probability mass function f0
i(x) equals the representative con-
sumer’s cautiousness t0(x). The sum of the second term on the right hand side of (10) is thus
the variance of the t0
i(fi(x)) with respect to the same probability mass function. It represents
the contribution of heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness to the derivative of the representa-
tive consumer’s absolute cautiousness. As we will see in the subsequent analysis, this theorem
has many implications, but its proof is surprisingly simple.














































i (fi(x)) ¡ t0(x)
¢2.
7We thank Christian Gollier for clarifying this point.
7Plug this result into equality (11), then we obtain (10). ¥
The proof makes it clear how the heterogeneity in the individual consumers’ absolute cau-
tiousness contributes to the convexity of the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness:
By (4), the latter is the weighted average of the former, and, by Proposition 3, the weights
f0
i(x) are increased for those consumers with higher absolute cautiousness. With diﬀering ab-
solute cautiousness, therefore, the representative consumer’s counterpart increases, resulting
in the convexity of his absolute risk tolerance.
A corollary of this theorem, in terms of the absolute risk tolerance, is:
Corollary 5 If ti is a convex function for every i, then so is t. If, moreover, the in-
dividual consumers’ absolute cautiousness are not completely equal at any aggregate con-




, there exist two consumers i and j such that
t0
i (fi(x)) 6= t0
j (fj(x))), then t is strictly convex.
Formula (10) suggests that even if all consumers exhibit concave, rather than convex, risk
tolerance, the representative consumer may exhibit convex risk tolerance. We can therefore
say that the aggregation over heterogeneous consumers tends to induce the representative
consumer to exhibit convex risk tolerance.
Calvet, Grandmont, and Lemaire (1999) gave a similar result for the representative con-
sumer’s relative risk tolerance. Speciﬁcally, denote by si(xi) consumer i’s relative risk tol-
erance ti(xi)=xi and by s(x) the representative consumer’s relative risk tolerance t(x)=x.
Rewriting their equality (6.10), multiplying x=s(x) to both sides, and rearranging the terms,
we obtain the following formula.8

















It is possible to derive from equality (3) that the mean of the individual consumers’ rela-
tive risk tolerance si(fi(x)) with respect to the probability mass function fi(x)=x equals the
representative consumer’s relative risk tolerance s(x). The sum in the second term on the
right hand side of (10) is thus the variance of the si(fi(x)) with respect to this probability
mass function. It represents the contribution of heterogeneity in relative risk tolerance to the
representative consumer’s relative cautiousness s0(x).
8We owe this proof to an anonymous referee






. A corollary to
Proposition 6, which is analogous to Corollary 5 is the following.
Corollary 7 Assume that di ¸ 0 for every i.
1. If si is a non-decreasing function for every i, then so is s. If, moreover, the individual
consumers’ relative risk tolerances are not completely equal at any aggregate consumption




, there exist two consumers i and j such that si (fi(x)) 6=
sj (fj(x))), then s is strictly increasing.
2. If bi is a non-increasing function for every i, then so is b. If, moreover, the individual
consumers’ relative risk aversions are not completely equal at any aggregate consumption




, there exist two consumers i and j such that bi (fi(x)) 6=
bj (fj(x))), then b is strictly decreasing.
The symmetry between formulas (10) and (12) is remarkable. The ﬁrst derivative of the
representative consumer’s relative risk tolerance and absolute cautiousness are increased by
heterogeneity of individual consumers’ risk attitudes. Neither of the two formulas is strictly
more general than the other, as either accommodates some cases that the other cannot.
5 Limit Behavior
In this section, we investigate the limit behavior of the representative consumer’s absolute
cautiousness, relative risk tolerance (and hence relative risk aversion), and the risk-sharing
rules. Roughly speaking, we show that the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness
tends to the limit of the most absolutely cautious consumers’ counterpart as the aggregate
consumption level tends to its upper bound d (which may be inﬁnite); and these consumers’
share of both the consumption levels, out of the aggregate consumption level, and of marginal
consumptions, converges to one. This result is particularly relevant in the analysis of a dy-
namic growing economy. We also provide an analogous result when the aggregate consumption
level tends to its lower bound d (which may be negative inﬁnite), but the dominant consumers
are then the least absolutely cautious ones. This result is relevant in the analysis of a dynamic
contracting economy.9 We also make statements of the limit behavior of the representative
9Dumas (1989) and Wang (1996) gave an analysis of this kind in a dynamic economy.
9consumer’s relative risk tolerance (and hence relative risk aversion). In the next section, we
will apply all of these results to the case where all consumers have HARA preferences.
As a convention of this paper, we allow lim to be 1 or ¡1; max and min may be 1 or
¡1 accordingly. From the outset, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 8 For every consumer i, both lim
xi!di
t0




It is possible to generalize the following propositions by replacing lim by limsup or liminf, if
the limits do not exist.
5.1 Absolute Cautiousness and Risk-Sharing Rules
We ﬁrst consider the following additional condition. It is intended to cover the case of in-
creasing absolute risk tolerance (and hence decreasing absolute risk aversion).
Assumption 9 For every consumer i, di > ¡1, di = 1, and lim
xi!di
ti (xi) = 0.






j(xj) for every j, and






j(xj) for every j. The following
proposition states that the share of consumers in I in the aggregate consumption level, as well
as in the marginal consumptions, converges to one as the aggregate consumption level diverges
to inﬁnity, and that the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness eventually equals
these consumers’ absolute cautiousness. It also states that the share of extra consumption
in excess of the lower bound which is consumed by consumers in I converges to one as the
aggregate consumption level converges to the lower bound. Also the representative consumer’s
absolute cautiousness eventually equals these consumers’ absolute cautiousness.









































10We defer the proof of this proposition to Appendix A, but can now mention its idea in passing:
While it is in general diﬃcult to obtain the closed-form solution for each consumer’s risk-
sharing rule fi(x), it is much easier to identify the relationship between two consumers’ risk-
sharing rules fi(x) and fj(x). If they both have constant (but diﬀering) absolute cautiousness,
then one can be written as a power function of the other, with the power equal to the ratio of
the two cautiousness. When either of the two is not constant, the equality no longer holds, but
some inequality holds for a power function, which is suﬃcient to establish the limit equalities
of Proposition 10.
We next consider the following additional condition. It is intended to cover the case
of decreasing absolute risk tolerance (and hence increasing absolute risk aversion), such as
quadratic utility functions.
Assumption 11 For every consumer i, di = ¡1, di < 1, and lim
xi!di
ti (xi) = 0.






j(xj) for every j, and H






j(xj) for every j.








































The proof of this proposition is analogous to that of Proposition 10. We thus omit it.
5.2 Relative Risk Tolerance and Relative Risk Aversion
Having done the analysis for the absolute cautiousness, we now move on to the analysis of
the relative risk tolerance and relative risk aversion. The key observation for the analysis
of the limit behavior of the representative consumer’s relative risk tolerance and relative












i(xi) by L’Hˆ opital’s rule. This allows us to apply
11Proposition 10 to the relative risk aversion. The additional assumption we need for this
argument is the following.
Assumption 13 For every consumer i, di = 0, and ti is a convex function.
This assumption can be satisﬁed by utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion.
Along with other assumptions, it implies that t0
i is a strictly positive, non-decreasing function.









The following proposition generalizes Proposition 3 of Benninga and Mayshar (2000).

























Proof of Proposition 14 1. By Proposition 10, lim
x!1t0(x) exists and, by L’Hˆ opital’s rule,
equals lim
x!1s(x). By the same proposition, lim
x!1t0(x) equals lim
xi!1t0









As for the limit as x ! 0, note that as x ! 0, fi(x) ! 0 and hence ti(fi(x)) ! 0. Thus
t(x) =
P
ti(fi(x)) ! 0. This shows that L’Hˆ opital’s rule is applicable and the rest of the
argument is as before.
2. This follows from part 1 and the deﬁnition of b and s. ¥
Now deﬁne J as the set of consumers i such that lim
xi!1si(xi) ¸ lim
xj!1sj(xj) for every
j, which is equivalent to lim
xi!1bi(xi) · lim
xj!1bj(xj) for every j. Analogously, deﬁne J as









bj(xj) for every j. We have already seen that J = I and J = I under
Assumption 13. Proposition 10 thus implies the following:

























126 Linear Absolute Risk Tolerance
Combining the preceding results and assuming that all consumers’ utility functions exhibit
linear absolute risk tolerance, we show in this section that an individual consumer’s risk-
sharing rule is either everywhere concave, everywhere convex, or has a unique inﬂection point
below which it is convex and above which it is concave.




! IR exhibits linear absolute risk tolerance
if, for the corresponding absolute risk tolerance ti, there exist two numbers ¿i and °i such that
ti (xi) = ¿i + °ixi: (13)




. This is equivalent to hyperbolic absolute risk aversion ai (xi) =
1
¿i + °ixi
and constant absolute cautiousness t0
i(xi) = °i.




but ¿i and °i may be positive, zero, or negative. However, if °i = 0, then ¿i > 0 and we take
di = ¡1 and di = 1. On the other hand, if °i > 0 then we take di = ¡¿i=°i and di = 1
and hence ti(xi) = °i (xi ¡ di) and ti(xi) ! 0 as xi ! di. If °i < 0, then di = ¡1 and




and ti(xi) ! 0 as xi ! di. Indeed, although we
do not provide the proof here, these choices of di and di are the only ones that allows ui to
satisfy the Inada condition.












be an eﬃcient risk-
sharing rule, and denote the representative consumer’s absolute risk aversion, absolute risk
tolerance, and relative risk aversion by a, t, and b, all corresponding to f.
As documented in, for example, Wilson (1968), Huang and Litzenberger (1988, Sections
5.15 and 5.26), Magill and Quinzii (1996, Proposition 16.3), Gollier (2001, Section 21.3.3),
and LeRoy and Werner (2001, Section 15.6)), the celebrated mutual fund theorem says, in
our notation, that if °1 = ¢¢¢ = °I, then fi is aﬃne for every i and t is aﬃne as well10.
Denote ° = maxf°1;:::;°Ig and ° = minf°1;:::;°Ig. Then, according to the notation
in the previous section, I = fi j °i = °g and I =
©
i j °i = °
ª
. Then I is the set of the most
absolutely cautious consumers and I is the set of the least absolutely cautious consumers. All
10We should also add that Kurosaki (2001) claimed that if all consumers exhibit constant relative risk aver-
sion, then the logarithmic risk-sharing rule, which assigns the mean of the logs of the consumers’ consumption
levels to the log of each individual consumer’s consumption level, is linear with a slope proportional to his own
relative risk tolerance.
13consumers are equally cautious if and only if ° = °. Of course, this case has been dealt with
by the mutual fund theorem, and we thus assume in the remainder of this section that ° > °.
The ﬁrst result of this section is concerned with the representative consumer’s absolute
risk tolerance.










Proof of Proposition 16 The ﬁrst part of this proposition follows from Corollary 5. The
second and third parts follow from Propositions 10 and 12, respectively.11
The main result of this section is the following classiﬁcation of risk-sharing rules.
Theorem 17 Assume that ° > °.
1. f00
















i (x) > 0 for every
x < yi and f00
i (x) < 0 for every x > yi.
4. For the yi deﬁned as in part 3, yi < yj if °i < °j; yi = yj if °i = °j; and yi > yj if
°i > °j.














is strictly increasing and onto. Hence, for every i = 2 I [ I; there exists




such that °i = t0(yi). Since °i = t0
i (fi(x)) for every x, Proposition 3
implies that yi has the property of part 3. Part 4 also follows from this property of yi and
the fact that t0 is strictly increasing. ¥
The next proposition is concerned with the total proportion of consumption levels con-
sumed by those consumers with the largest or smallest absolute cautiousness. It immediately
follows from Propositions 10 and 12. We thus omit the proof.
11Strictly speaking Propositions 10 and 12 were shown to hold only under the assumption that the consumers’
levels of cautiousness are either all strictly negative or strictly positive. Proposition 16 is still true even without
these assumptions.
14Proposition 18


























If we further assume that di = 0, ¿i = 0, and °i > 0 for every i, then bi (xi) = 1=°i and
hence ui exhibits constant relative risk aversion 1=°i. The following result, which follows from
Proposition 16, is concerned with this case.
Proposition 19 Assume that di = 0, ¿i = 0, and °i > 0 for every i, and that ° > °.
1. lim
x!1









We have presented detailed properties of the eﬃcient risk-sharing rules and the representative
consumer’s risk attitude in an economy under uncertainty where individual consumers have
homogeneous probabilistic beliefs over the state space but heterogeneous risk attitudes. In
particular, we have shown that heterogeneity in the consumers’ absolute cautiousness, which
is the derivative of the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, is a key
factor for the curvature of the risk-sharing rules. We have also shown that the heterogeneity
in the individual consumers’ risk attitudes has a convexifying eﬀect on the representative
consumer’s absolute risk tolerance. We now turn to a discussion of the consequences of our
results under three headings: Convex absolute risk tolerance; risk-sharing rules; and asset
pricing.
7.1 Convex Absolute Risk Tolerance
Based on recent data on Italian households, Guiso and Paiella (2000) found that individual
consumers exhibit concave absolute risk tolerance and that there is some heterogeneity in their
risk attitudes. Hence, by Theorem 4, the representative consumer may well exhibit convex
absolute risk tolerance. Now suppose that this is indeed the case, and yet we erroneously
assumed that the economy were to consist of individual consumers having the same risk
15attitude as the representative consumer. We would then conclude that individual consumers
exhibit convex absolute risk tolerance, which has a few testable implications. One, for instance,
is that, according to Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002), younger individual consumers invest more
in risky assets than wealth-equivalent older counterparts, but this contradicts the empirical
ﬁndings of, for example, Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996). While this contradiction would
constitute a puzzle under the erroneous assumption, it does not do so if the heterogeneity in
absolute cautiousness and their convexifying eﬀect are taken into consideration, as exempliﬁed
by formula (10).
7.2 Risk-Sharing Rules
Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 17, which dealt with the risk sharing rules for the most and least
cautious consumer, have been obtained by Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981),
who considered the expected utility maximization problem of a consumer who chooses over
state-contingent claims of a reference portfolio. Holding the underlying asset and a put option
is equivalent to holding cash and a call option of the same exercise price, but these are also
equivalent to having a portfolio insurance as well. In all of these cases, the generated return
is a convex function of the values of the portfolio. They were thus led to identify conditions
on the consumer’s utility function for his optimal choice of return to be a convex function of
the value of the portfolio.
The most important diﬀerences between this work and theirs is that they took the repre-
sentative consumer’s risk aversion as given, while we derive it as a result of eﬃcient risk-sharing
among heterogeneous consumers. In fact, our result shows that the case Leland (1980) an-
alyzed on page 589, where the individual and the representative consumers exhibit constant
but diﬀering relative risk aversion, is in fact impossible, if all the other consumers also exhibit
constant relative risk aversion.
Also, the importance of part 3 of Theorem 17, i.e., the fact that risk-sharing rules for
intermediate linearly risk tolerant consumers are initially convex and eventually concave, can-
not be overemphasized. It is exactly the point that is not present in the analysis of Leland
(1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981). When individual consumers have diﬀering degrees
of absolute cautiousness, the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness is strictly in-
creasing, ranging from the smallest to the largest. If an individual consumer has neither the
smallest nor the largest absolute cautiousness, then his absolute cautiousness must be caught
16up with by the representative consumer’s counterpart at some aggregate consumption level.
Below this level, his risk-sharing rule is convex, and, above this level, it is concave. Then only
consumers with the smallest relative risk aversion (the largest absolute cautiousness) would
buy portfolio insurance, as the others’ risk-sharing rules would eventually become concave.
This signiﬁcantly undermines the applicability of the results of Leland (1980) and Brennan
and Solanki (1981). They are valid in a two-consumer economy, but do not generalize to an
economy with a large number of consumers with diverse levels of relative risk aversion. This
conﬁrms a conjecture by Dumas (1989), who concentrated on a two-consumer economy but
concluded by suggesting that the equilibrium behavior of a three-consumer economy may be
critically diﬀerent from that in his two-consumer economy.
Part 3 of Theorem 17 can be partially extended to the general case. Call an intermediate
consumer a consumer whose absolute cautiousness is neither the largest nor the smallest when
aggregate endowment tends to either of its limits. Then this intermediate consumer’s risk-
sharing rule must be initially convex and eventually concave. Given smoothness of all utility
functions, this consumer’s risk-sharing rule must have at least one inﬂection point.
7.3 Asset Pricing
As is well known, any positive multiple of the representative consumer’s marginal utility u0(³)
is a state price deﬂator (also known as the state price density and as the pricing kernel). This



























! IR, so that the derivative asset pays '(³).
Then the relative price of any derivative asset '(³) with respect to the risk-free bond equals
E (¼'(³)). Since ¼ > 0 and E(¼) = 1, ¼ has the property of a density function.
We now explore how assets may be mis-priced if a modeler ignores the issue of aggregation
and erroneously assumes that the representative agent behaves just as an individual consumer
in the economy.
To illustrate our ﬁrst example of mis-pricing, assume that each consumer exhibits linear
absolute risk tolerance, but its ﬁrst derivative, the absolute cautiousness, diﬀers across them.
We then know from Corollary 5 that the representative consumer’s absolute risk tolerance is a
17strictly convex function of aggregate consumptions. Yet, suppose that a modeler erroneously
assumed that the representative consumer would also exhibit linear absolute risk tolerance,
such that the absolute risk tolerance and cautiousness are chosen to match the true values at
some aggregate consumption level.12 This is similar to but diﬀerent from the approximation









! IR by b t(x) = t0(y)(x ¡ y) + t(y), then b t is the best linear approximation of




















This would be the state-price deﬂator if the representative consumer’s risk tolerance were b t.
The following proposition states that this linear approximation b ¼ underestimates the price of
every derivative asset '(³) whenever ' is an increasing function and all individual consumers
exhibit convex risk tolerance.
Proposition 20 Suppose that ti is convex for every i and that either there exists a consumer
i such that t00
i (fi(x)) > 0 or there exist two consumers i and j such that t0
i (fi(x)) 6= t0
j (fj(x)).




! IR is non-constant and non-decreasing, then
E (¼'(³)) > E (b ¼'(³)): (16)



































Thus ¼=b ¼ is a strictly increasing function of ³. Hence the distribution of ³ with respect to the
probability measure whose Radon-Nikodym derivative is ¼ ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates
the distribution of ³ with respect to the probability measure whose Radon-Nikodym derivative
is b ¼. Then the strict inequality (16) follows from the assumption that ' is non-constant and
non-decreasing. ¥
12This is equivalent to saying that the absolute risk tolerance of the hypothetical representative consumer
is a linear approximation of that of the true representative consumer at some aggregate consumption level.
Since the absolute risk tolerance of the hypothetical representative consumer need not be equal to zero at zero
consumption, the resulting relative risk aversion need not be constant.
18The above proposition states that the price of any asset with an increasing payoﬀ function
(of aggregate endowment) would be under-estimated. Since the aggregate endowment is an
increasing function of itself, this implies that the equity premium is under-estimated. Hence
a modeler would ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to match the observed equity premium with reasonable
risk preferences if she ignores the convexifying eﬀect of aggregation on the representative
consumer’s absolute risk tolerance.
To consider another type of mis-pricing, suppose that individuals consumers display con-
stant relative risk aversion but are heterogeneous with respect to the degree of relative risk
aversion. The representative consumer, by force of Corollary 7, displays strictly decreasing
relative risk aversion. Yet, suppose that a modeler erroneously assumed that he would also
display constant relative risk aversion. Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1999) showed
that even if the relative risk aversion is chosen such that the theoretical equity premium is
matched to the true equity premium (of the aggregate endowment), the price of any asset
with a convex payoﬀ function (of aggregate endowment), such as call and put options, is
under-estimated. We should note its consistency with empirical ﬁndings: A¨ ıt-Sahalia and Lo
(2000) derived the representative consumer’s relative risk aversion from option prices in a non-
parametric, non-linear way. They ﬁnd that it is decreasing (almost) everywhere. Numerical
examples of mis-pricing of options were given in Benninga and Mayshar (2000) and Huang
(2003). In particular, Benninga and Mayshar (2000) calculated ratios of the true prices to the
predictions based on the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (which is greater than
one in most cases) for various exercise prices and various choices of the values of the constant
relative risk aversion for the representative consumer. Huang (2003) did a similar exercise
for the case where the decreasing relative risk aversion arose from heterogeneous probabilistic
beliefs among consumers on the distribution of aggregate endowments.
We now turn to the implication of decreasing relative risk aversion to the equity premium
puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Another way to write the state price deﬂator ¼ is u0
E(u0(³)).
The equity premium (relative to the risk-free bond) can then be expressed as
E(³)
E(¼³) ¡ 1 =
E(³)E(u0(³))
E(³u0(³)) ¡ 1. According to Gollier (2001, p. 69), when the variance (and other higher
order moments) of ³ is much smaller than its expected value, the equity premium can be
approximated by Var(³)
(E(³))2b(E(³)).
Barsky et al (1997, Footnote 18) report that in their experimental study, ﬁve percent of
subjects display a relative risk aversion of 33 or more; the median relative risk aversion is 7;
19and only ﬁve percent display a relative risk aversion of 1.3 or less. According to Corollary 7
the representative agents relative risk aversion would then range from levels higher than 33
for very low aggregate endowment to levels lower than 1.3 for very high levels of aggregate
endowment. This means that in a growing economy, as in the US, we would expect the equity
premium to be decreasing over time. This is very much consistent with recent empirical studies
by, for example, Blanchard (1993) and Jagannathan et al (2000). If we use the estimate of
Var(³)
(E(³))2 = 0:056 from Gollier (2001, p. 69), then we obtain an equity premium of roughly 2%
for early years (low aggregate consumption) and one of roughly 0.07% for later years (with
high aggregate consumption). Thus, to argue that the heterogeneity in risk aversion can
explain the equity premium, we have to show that the relevant aggregate consumption is so
low that the representative consumer is mostly driven by the most risk-averse individuals in
the economy. Otherwise, the puzzle may even be further deepened.
While the model of this paper is a static one, the results can be extended to dynamic
models, as mentioned in the introduction. The impact of heterogeneity on the risk-free interest
rate can then be shown to consist of two factors. First, since the representative consumer
displays decreasing relative risk aversion, he tends to become more willing to substitute future
consumptions for current consumptions in a growing economy. This causes interest rates to
decrease. Second, as discussed in Hara (2006), even if the representative consumer’s relative
risk aversion is correctly estimated at a given aggregate consumption level, if it is, erroneously,
assumed to be constant rather than decreasing, then the representative consumer’s relative
prudence, which measures the strength of the precautionary saving motive, is underestimated.
This leads to an overestimation of the risk-free interest rates. In short, the risk-free interest
rates tend to be lower in a heterogenous economy than in a representative-consumer economy.
A Proof of Proposition 10
To prove Proposition 10, we need two lemmas. The ﬁrst one is concerned with the limit
behavior of the ratio of two individual consumers’ risk-sharing rules and their derivatives
when the aggregate consumption levels diverge to inﬁnity.
















20Proof of Lemma 21 Let two real numbers ±i and ±j be such that lim
xi!1t0
i (xi) < ±i < ±j <
lim
xj!1t0
j (xj). Since di = 1 and ti(xi) > 0 for every xi, lim
xi!1t0
i (xi) ¸ 0. Hence ±i > 0 and
±j > 0. Then let x > d be such that t0
i (xi) < ±i < ±j < t0
j (xj) for every xi ¸ fi (x) and
xj ¸ fj (x). Then, for such xi and xj,
ti(xi) <±i (xi ¡ fi (x)) + ti (fi(x));
tj(xj) >±j (xj ¡ fj (x)) + tj (fj(x)):
By equality (2) and the fact that a consumer’s absolute risk aversion ai(¢) is the reciprocal of









for every x ¸ x. By integration by parts, this is equivalent to
Z fi(x)
fi(x)
ai (z) dz =
Z fj(x)
fj(x)









±j (z ¡ fj (x)) + tj (fj (x))
:
Take the integral and then the exponential of both sides, then we obtain
µ









because 0 < ±i < ±j. Thus



















Since 0 < ±i=±j < 1,
fi(x) ¡ fi (x) +
ti (fi (x))
±i
















fi(x) ¡ fi (x) +
ti (fi (x))
±i




21By (19), the far right hand side converges to 0. Hence f0
i(x)=f0
j(x) ! 0. ¥
The next lemma is concerned with the limit behavior of the risk-sharing rules when the
aggregate consumption levels converge to the lower bound.


















Proof of Lemma 22 Let two real numbers ±i and ±j be such that lim
xj!dj
t0








0. Hence ±j > 0 and ±i > 0. Then let x > d be such that t0
j (xj) < ±j < ±i < t0
i (xi)
for every xi · fi (x) and xj · fj (x). Thus, for such xi and xj, ti (xi) > ±i (xi ¡ di) and

























±i (z ¡ di)
(20)
Thus µ
fj (x) ¡ dj




fi (x) ¡ di
fi (x) ¡ di
¶1=±i
:
Hence there exists a positive number k such that
fi (x) ¡ di < k
¡
fj (x) ¡ dj
¢±i=±j : (21)
















are smooth, one-to-one, and








that is smooth, one-to-one, and onto, has strictly positive derivatives, and satisﬁes fi (x)¡di =
'
¡
fj (x) ¡ dj
¢





Hence, by ±j=±i > 1, '(z)=z ! 0 and '0(z) ! 0 as z ! 0. If z and x satisfy z = fi(x) ¡ di,




! 0 as x ! d. Moreover,




i(x) ! 0 as x ! d. ¥
We can now turn to the proof of Proposition 10.

























By Lemma 21, the far right hand side equals zero. Thus fj(x)=x ! 0. Since this is true for
every j 62 I and
PI
i=1 fi(x)=x = 1, we must have
P
i2I fi(x)=x ! 1 as x ! 1.
Also, since 0 < f0





i(x) and, for such i and j as in the
preceding paragraph, the far right hand side converges to zero as x ! 1. Hence f0
j(x) ! 0
as x ! 1. We must have
P
i2I f0





for every i 2 I and j 62 I, t0
j (fj(x))f0




i(x) · 1, we have









· limsupx!1 maxi2I t0








i (xi) · liminf
x!1
t0(x);
can be shown analogously. This proves the ﬁrst two parts of this proposition.
To prove part 3, let i 2 I and j 62 I. Since 0 <
fi(x) ¡ di
x ¡ d






















By Lemma 22, the far right hand side equals zero. Hence
P
i2I (fi(x) ¡ di)
x ¡ d
! 1 as x ! d.
Part 4 can be shown in the same manner as for part 2. ¥
References
[1] Yacine A¨ ıt-Sahalia and Andrew W. Lo, 2000, Nonparametric risk management and im-
plied risk aversion, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 94, pp. 9–51.
[2] Robert B. Barsky, F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball, Matthew D. Shapiro, 1997,
Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental approach in the
health and retirement study, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, pp. 537–579.
[3] Simon Benninga and Joram Mayshar, 2000, Heterogeneity and option pricing, Review of
Derivatives Research, Vol. 4, pp. 7–27.
23[4] Olivier J. Blanchard, 1993, Movements in the equity premium, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, Macroeconomics, Vol. 2, pp. 75–118.
[5] Karl Borch, 1962, Equilibrium in a reinsurance market, Econometrica, Vol. 30, No. 3,
pp. 424–444.
[6] Michael J. Brennan and R. Solanki, 1981, Optimal portfolio insurance, Journal of Fi-
nancial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 279–300.
[7] Laurent Calvet, Jean-Michel Grandmont, and Isabelle Lemaire, 1999, Aggregation of
heterogeneous beliefs and asset pricing in complete ﬁnancial markets, mimeo.
[8] John Y. Campbell and John H. Cochrane, 1999, By force of habit: A consumption-based
explanation of aggregate stock market behavior, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107,
pp. 205–251.
[9] Yeung Lewis Chan and Leonid Kogan, 2002, Catching up with the Joneses: Heteroge-
neous preferences and the dynamics of asset prices, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
110, pp. 1255–1285.
[10] Bernard Dumas, 1989, Two-person dynamic equilibrium in the capital market, Review
of Financial Studies, Vol. 2, pp. 157–188.
[11] G¨ unter Franke, Richard C. Stapleton, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, 1999, When are options
overpriced? The Black-Scholes model and alternative characterisations of the pricing
kernel, European Finance Review, Vol. 3, pp. 79–102.
[12] Christian Gollier, 2001, Economics of Time and Risk, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
[13] Christian Gollier and Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2002, Horizon length and portfolio risk,
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 24:3, pp. 195–212.
[14] Luigi Guiso, Tullio Jappelli, and Daniele Terlizzese, 1996, Income risk, borrowing con-
straints and portfolio choice, American Economic Review, Vol. 86, pp. 158–172.
[15] Luigi Guiso and Monica Paiella, 2000, Risk aversion, wealth and ﬁnancial market imper-
fections, mimeo.
[16] Chiaki Hara, 2006, Heterogeneity of risk attitudes in a continuous-time model, mimeo.
24[17] Chiaki Hara and Christoph Kuzmics, 2005, Representative consumer’s risk aversion and
eﬃcient risk-sharing rules, mimeo.
[18] Chi-Fu Huang and Richard Litzenberger, 1988, Foundations of Financial Economics,
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[19] Xiaoping (James) Huang, 2000a, Demand for and Pricing of Options, Ph.D. Thesis,
Department of Accounting and Finance, Strathclyde University.
[20] James Huang, 2000b, Who buys options from whom? The role of options in an economy
with heterogeneous preferences and beliefs, Lancaster University Management School
Working Paper 2000/023 (revised on May 2002).
[21] James Huang, 2002, Existence of an optimal portfolio for every investor in an Arrow-
Debreu economy, Lancaster University Management School Working Paper 2002/012.
[22] James Huang, 2003, Impact of divergent consumer conﬁdence on option prices, Review
of Derivatives Research, Vol. 6, pp. 165–177.
[23] Ravi Jagannathan, Ellen R. McGrattan, and Anna Scherbina, 2000, The declining US
equity premium, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 24, 4, pp.
3–19.
[24] David M. Kreps, 1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
[25] Takashi Kurosaki, 2001, Consumption smoothing and the structure of risk and time
preferences: theory and evidence from village India, Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics,
Vol. 42, pp. 103–117.
[26] Hayne E. Leland, 1980, Who should buy portfolio insurance, Journal of Finance, Vol.
35, No. 2, pp. 581–594.
[27] Stephen LeRoy, and Jan Werner, 2001, Principles of Financial Economics, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
[28] Michael Magill and Martine Quinzii, 1996, Incomplete Markets, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass.
25[29] Rajnish Mehra, and Edward C. Prescott, 1985, The Equity premium: A puzzle, Journal
of Monetary Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 145–61.
[30] Jiang Wang, 1996, The term structure of interest rates in a pure exchange economy with
heterogeneous investors, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 75–110.
[31] Robert Wilson, 1968, The theory of syndicates, Econometrica, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 119–
132.
26